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Corrado: Responsibility and Control

RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL
Michael Louis Corrado*
In two recent cases, Kansas v. Hendricks' and Kansas v. Crane,2
the Supreme Court upheld sex predator legislation. The Kansas statute,3
which is similar to legislation adopted in other states,4 provides for the
indefinite detention of those classified as sex predators. The detention is
to begin after the offender has served a prison term and will continue for
as long as he remains dangerous. 5 One objection to the legislation had
been that it permitted the detention of individuals who were considered
legally sane and who were not being punished for any past crime (having
paid the penalty for the crime that brought them to the law's attention).
Some thought that approving preventive detention in such cases was an
abuse of traditionally recognized rights under the Constitution.6

*

Arch T. Allen Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of

Law.
1. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
2. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
3. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 29a15 (1994).
4. See, for example, the Washington state statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 to
71.09.902 (West 2002).
5. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07.
6. In its amicus brief, the ACLU, for example, argued that the Act violated substantive due
process because "in reality [though labeled civil commitment, the Act] is intended to extend
indefinitely the confinement of sex offenders considered dangerous, but who are not mentally ill,
even though they have completed their judicially imposed incarceration and are legally entitled to
be released." Brief of the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 9, Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 471020. There was an earlier period
during which the states adopted sexual-psychopath legislation:
Starting in the 1950s, sexual psychopaths, however defined, were targeted for indefinite
detention. Many of these offenders were not dangerous, but were considered socially
deviant, and upon conviction were either sentenced or committed civilly. During the
early to mid-1990s, a number of states reinvigorated their civil commitment statutes for
sex offenders, despite the criticism levied against earlier legislation ... and its abolition
during the 1970s.
Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender Commitment and
Sicherungverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621, 1629-30 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
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The Court carved a limitation out of the language of the statute: it
found that the legislation permitted indefinite detention only of those sex
offenders who could not control their sexually violent behavior.
Hendricks had freely admitted that he could not control his behavior, and
so his detention was affirmed. 8 But Crane had not confessed to any lack
of control, nor had the state made any showing of a lack of control in his
case, and so the Crane case was sent back for a determination of that
issue. 9 This was not merely intended to be an interpretation of the
statute. It was clear that if the Court had not been able to read the
limitation into the legislation,
the legislation would not have withstood
10
constitutional scrutiny.
The Court's reliance on lack of control as an essential characteristic
of the detainable sex predator has bothered some commentators. In the
second half of the twentieth century there had been an intense campaign
to rid the law of what was described as an incoherent notion, namely the
idea that someone who was fully rational might lack control over his
intentional actions. Unless the actor suffered from a defect of rationality
or cognition," it was argued, he was responsible for what he did.12 The

7. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (rejecting the argument that "the Constitution permits commitment
of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control
determination"); cf Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 ("The precommitment requirement of a 'mental
abnormality' or 'personal disorder' is consistent with the requirements of these other statutes that
we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are
unable to control their dangerousness.").
8. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at354-55.
9. Crane, 534U.S. at411-12,415.
10. Thus there was a disagreement between Justice Thomas, the author of the earlier
Hendricks opinion, and the majority in the later Crane case. Although Thomas had spoken of a lack
of control as a condition of detention, he joined the Scalia dissent in the Crane case which denied
that that was what was intended. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 422-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, the Crane majority insisted upon it, and it seems unlikely that Thomas would have
gotten a majority to uphold the statute in Hendricks if he had not been understood to have intended
to limit the statute's application to those who could not control their behavior.
11. Throughout this Article, I will treat the phrases "defect of rationality" and "cognitive
defect" as more or less interchangeable. Rationality and cognition are, of course, not the same thing;
one has to do with the processing of information and the other with the acquisition of information.
But the defects that are intended when there is talk in criminal law of either defects of rationality or
cognitive defects include both defects in processing-for example, a persistent tendency to find
threatening situations in the most harmless circumstances-and defects in acquisition-for example,
the tendency to hear voices when no one is speaking.
12. See, e.g., Insanity Def. Work Group, Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, APA Statement on the
Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 681-82 (1983) [hereinafter APA Statement on the
Insanity Defense].
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campaign was remarkably successful,
affecting most notably the laws
13
governing insanity and addiction.
The trend in insanity law had been to excuse both those who
suffered from an absence of rationality-a cognitive defect-and those
who suffered from a lack of control-a volitional defect. Starting in the
1980s, roughly at the time of the assassination attempt on the life of
Ronald Reagan, the momentum began to go in the other direction. For
example, where federal courts generally had adopted the Model Penal
Code's ("M.P.C.") approach recognizing both cognitive and volitional
defects, 14 in 1984 Congress imposed a new insanity defense by statute,
one recognizing only cognitive or rationality defects.15 Many states
made similar changes; jurisdictions that still had something like the old
M'Naghten cognitive test simply kept the law they had. By my survey,
thirty states, in 1980, had two-prong insanity rules, with both cognitive16
and volitional prongs: only eighteen still had the older one-prong test.
13. For the changes in the insanity defense, see RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., A CASE STUDY IN
THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 121-37 (2d ed. 2000).
14. Section 4.01 of the M.P.C. states: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962) (alteration in original). The first part,
involving the capacity to appreciate, is the cognitive branch; the second part, involving the capacity
to control, is the volitional branch.
15. The statute states:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of
the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe
mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts.
18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1992). This statute differs from the M.P.C. defense primarily in dropping the
volitional branch of that defense. But it also introduces the word "severe" before "mental disease or
defect." Compare id with MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).
16. States with a two-prong test in 1980 include: Alabama, Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854 (Ala.
1887); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.083(a) (1972); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-601 (1977);
California, People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 1318 (Cal. 1978); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101
(1973); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (1971); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§401 (1979); Hawii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-400 (1976); Idaho, State v White, 456 P.2d 797
(Idaho 1969); Illinois, People v. Meeker, 407 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. 1980); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-41-3-6 (1979); Kentucky, Henderson v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1974); Maine,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 58(1) (1976); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 59-25
(1979 repl. vol.); Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. 1967);
Michigan, People v Crawford, 279 N.W.2d 560 (Mich. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 768.21a(l) (Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. 28.1044(1) (Callaghan 1978); Missouri, MO. REV.
STAT. § 552.030 (1969); Montana (up to 1979); New Mexico, State v. Dorsey, 603 P.2d 717 (N.M.
1979) (discussing a a third prong to the two-prong test); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE, § 12.104-03 (Supp. 1976); Ohio, State v Staten, 267 N.E.2d 122 (Ohio 1971), vacated 408 U.S. 938
(1972); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295(1) (1971); Rhode Island, State v Johnson, 399 A.2d 469
(R.I. 1979); Tennessee, Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977); Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE
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By 2004, only fifteen states still had7 the two-prong test, and thirty had
the one-prong, purely cognitive test.'
Similarly, although the Supreme Court had begun a line of
reasoning in Robinson v. California'8 that might have led to a
constitutional excuse for the addict who was unable to control his
behavior,' 9 that line came to an abrupt halt in Powell v. Texas, 20 at least
as far as the constitutional issue goes. And the idea that the addict
suffered from control difficulties that might warrant a common law
excuse in spite of Powell received a typical reception in United States v.
Moore.2 1 One argument most of the judges found persuasive in Moore
was that an addiction excuse could not be restricted to possession and
other addictive behavior, but would have to be extended to armed
ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 1974); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1975); Vermont, State v.
Goyet, 132 A.2d 623, (Vt. 1957); Virginia, Davis v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 272 (Va. 1974);
West Virginia, State v. Grimm, 195 S.E.2d 637 (W. Va. 1973); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.15 (1971); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-242.4 (1975). One state, Montana, had no
insanity defense at all, having gotten rid of it entirely in 1979; New Hampshire had its own test
which did not involve particular volitional or cognitive disabilities. See State v Plummer, 374 A.2d
431 (N.H. 1977).
17. Of the thirty states (excluding Montana) which had a two-prong test in 1980, the
following reverted to a one prong test by 2005: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (2005); Alaska,
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (2005); California, CAL. PEN. CODE § 25 (2005); Delaware, DEL. CODE

ANN., tit. 11, § 401 (2005); Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-2 (2005); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-41-3-6 (Burns 2005); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (2005); Missouri, MO. REV.
STAT. § 552.030 (2005); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE, § 12.1-04.1-01 (2005); Ohio, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(14) (2005); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (2005); Texas,
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (2005). Some states went from a two-prong test to no insanity
defense at all: Montana (in 1979), MONT. CODE ANN. § 95-501(a) (Smith 1947 & Supp. 1977)
(repealed 1979); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (2005) (stating that mental illnes is a defense
to the mental-state element of the offense charged only); and Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207
(2005). New Hampshire still had its own unique version of the defense, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
628:2 (2005). Kansas, which had a one prong test in 1980, has no separate insanity defense at all,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (2005).
18. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
19. See Easter v. Dist. of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 51, 53, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v.
Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir. 1966). Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority in
Robinson, used the unfortunate term "disease" in describing addiction, suggesting that the addict
was utterly without control over his behavior. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67. But there was also talk
about compulsion and the severe difficulty some addicts had in avoiding addictive behavior.
According to Justice Douglas, "the addict is under compulsions not capable of management without
outside help." Id. at 671 (Douglas, J., concurring). The "disease" label is a red herring that has
drawn a lot of abuse and that has deflected rational discussion of addiction. What is important is not
whether addiction is a disease or not, but whether the addict has unusual difficulty in conforming his
behavior to the law. Difficulty in conforming to the law is always a factor in assessing blame, and,
after a certain point, the severity of the difficulty should relieve the actor of responsibility. The only
controversial issue is where to draw the line.
20. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
21. 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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robbery, if that was required to support an addict's habit. 22 But the more

interesting argument, from our point of view, was the one disparaging
control difficulties, which found expression, for example in the
concurring opinion of Judge MacKinnon:
In my view the most impractical aspect of the "lack of substantial
capacity to conform their conduct" test is that in applying such test it
would be practically impossible to separate those who lacked
substantial capacity to conform their conduct to the law from those
who possessed such capacity but who merely refused to conform their
conduct.... It would thus be the cause of great mischief
besides
23

favoring gross users of narcotics over those less addicted.

But no sooner had the idea of control difficulties begun to leave by
,the front door than it began to creep in again by the back door, in such
things as sex-predator legislation and the guilty-but-mentally-ill plea.
The Kansas statute, like many such statutes, applied to those with a
"congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent
offenses." 24 That statutory language is the language the Crane majority
interpreted to require a control defect. In some states, the new guilty-butmentally-ill statute similarly provides for imprisonment followed by
indefinite detention for those who suffer from volitional but not
cognitive defects.25
Commentators who opposed the idea of control defects when the
insanity defense was in issue ought to oppose the idea in the context of
sex-predator and guilty-but-mentally-ill legislation. Although there is not
22. Id. at 1146; see also id. at 1260 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. Id.at 1208 (MacKinnon, J., concurring); accord APA Statement on the Insanity Defense,
supra note 12, at 685 (distinguishing between inability to conform and simple failure to conform to
the law, and stating "[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is
probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk").
24. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
25. For such an example, see Delaware's statute:
Where the trier of fact determines that, at the time of the conduct charged, a defendant
suffered from a psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbed such person's
thinking, feeling or behavior and/or that such psychiatric disorder left such person with
insufficient willpower to choose whether the person would do the act or refrain from
doing it, although physically capable, the trier of fact shall return a verdict of "guilty, but
mentally ill."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,§ 401(b) (2004). Another example can be seen in South Carolina:
A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the commission of the act
constituting the offense, he had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong or to
recognize his act as being wrong ...but because of mental disease or defect he lacked
sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(A) (2003).
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the same political opposition-after all, both sorts of legislation extend
the criminal penalty rather than provide an excuse-serious
commentators do in fact raise the same objections: they argue that the
notion of control difficulties is incoherent; that there is no more
difference between being unable to conform and being unwilling to
conform than there is between "dusk and twilight"; and26 that anyone
rational who has willed an action eo ipso is in control of it.
If these commentators are right, what should happen to such things
as the sex predator legislation? One of two things: Either it should be
withdrawn, and sex offenders who were not incapable of rational
thought-and thus not legally insane-should be treated as fully sane
and punished but not detained; or the identification of sex predators
should depend upon some other characteristic that justifies preventive
detention. Stephen Morse has proposed the first alternative, which has
the advantage of preserving the classical distinction between those who
are responsible for what they do, and thus may be punished but not
detained, and those who are not responsible for what they do, and thus
may be detained but not punished.2 7 Christopher Slobogin has proposed
the second, taking undeterrability as the relevant characteristic. 28 While
Slobogin's proposal would save sex predator legislation, it would also
justify the extension of indefinite detention to others not easily
deterred-hardened criminals, accused terrorists, and so on. It is worth
noting that the question of extending indefinite detention to citizens
accused of terrorist activities has already been raised and
that Hendricks
29
was among the cases cited in support of that extension.
I think both positions are mistaken. Regardless of the merits or
demerits of the two proposals, they both rest on the same mistaken
premise-that we cannot make sense of a lack of control. Slobogin
follows Morse in this, but Morse's arguments are rather thin and don't
support the premise. Indeed, as I will try to show, a consistent definition
of a control difficulty is possible. But even if that is so, and even if the

26. See infra text accompanying notes 90-95.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 43-44.
28. See infra note 53.
29. Padilla exrel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affdon reh g
sub noma., Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub noma., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). In a related case, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia observed that "[t]his case appears to be the first in American jurisprudence
where an American citizen has been held incommunicado and subjected to an indefinite detention in
the continental United States without charges, without any findings by a military tribunal, and
without access to a lawyer." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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Supreme Court is right and the idea of an individual lacking control over
his behavior does make sense, that doesn't mean that the sex-predator
legislation should stand. For if it is possible for those who understand
what they are doing to nevertheless lack control over it, then if we still
believe that responsibility for a crime is a condition of punishment, we
must take the question of the punishment of compulsive sex offenders
seriously. We must reconsider the insanity defense and its rationale. We
must determine whether those who cannot fully control their behavior, if
there are any who cannot control their behavior, 30 should be held
responsible for what they do. And only the answer to that question will
determine the proper fate of sex predator legislation.
I.

A STRAIN

ON TRADITIONAL CATEGORIES

Under what I will call the traditional view of punishment, the state
was limited by two presuppositions:
1. Only those who are responsible for what they do may be punished.
2. Only those who have a reasonable awareness of the consequences of
their actions and a fair opportunity
to do otherwise may be held
31
responsible for what they do.
A fair opportunity to do otherwise includes the ability to do otherwise
and control over what you do. 32 Under this view, those who broke the
law but were not able to appreciate the consequences of their actions or
were not in control of them might be detained or committed but not
punished. If we set out the various possibilities on a matrix it would look
something like this:

30. The fact that an idea is coherent does not mean that it has any application to the actual
world. But if the idea is coherent, then we can no longer dismiss evidence of the thing's existence
out of hand. We must take seriously those clinicians who tell us that addicts-some addicts-may
not have sufficient control over their behavior to be held responsible; we must take seriously those
clinicians who tell us that those suffering from certain compulsions, including perhaps sexual
compulsions, may not be in full control of their behavior. It may be that legal insanity is not the
neatest category for those suffering from such compulsive behavior, but the cash valuenonresponsibility and possible detention-should be the same when serious violent crimes are in
question.
31. H. L. A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136, 152 (1968); Michael Corrado, Notes on

the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 471 (1991).
32. See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 478 (1968). On the
element of control, see JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL:
A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 240-44 (1998). On the ability to do otherwise and on the
Frankfurt counterexamples to that element, see Michael Corrado, Automatism and the Theory of
Action, 39 EMORY L.J. 1191, 1222-27 (1990).
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Reasonably Able to
Appreciate Consequences

Not Reasonably Able to
Appreciate Consequences

Reasonably in Control

1.
Punishable

2.
Detainable
but not punishable

Not Reasonably in Control

3.
Detainable
but not punishable

4.
Detainable
but not punishable

Under the traditional understanding, those in the first quadrant are
responsible for what they do and may be punished. Those in the other
quadrants are not responsible and may not be punished.
What has changed with the sex-predator legislation, and with the
entire assault upon the requirement of control, is the third quadrant. The
sex predator is not legally insane, and he may be punished. The matrix
now looks like this, at least with respect to sex predators:

Reasonably in Control
Not Reasonably in Control

Reasonably Able to
Appreciate Consequences

Not Reasonably Able to
Appreciate Consequences

1.
Punishable

2.
Detainable
but not punishable

3.
Detainable
I and punishable

4.
Detainable
but not punishable

This change is true not only of sex predators, but (as I have pointed out
above) also of some adjudged guilty but mentally ill. That is, in some
jurisdictions offenders who understand what they are doing but are
unable to control their behavior nevertheless will, under guilty-butmentally-ill legislation, be found sane and sentenced to imprisonment, to
be followed by indefinite detentiofi.
To justify this new treatment of individuals in category three, we
must reject one or the other of the premises set out above. Since those
who cannot control their behavior are subject to punishment, it follows
that either punishment does not require responsibility or responsibility
does not require control. Whichever of the two premises we reject,
however, other pressing questions arise. Suppose that we take the first
option, that punishment does not require responsibility. Then, the fact
that those who up to now have been considered legally insane are not
responsible for what they do is irrelevant, and they may be punished.
There is no problem, then, about punishing those in the third group. But
if responsibility is irrelevant to punishment, neither would there be a
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problem about punishing those in the second and fourth groups. The
implications for the matrix are seen here:

Reasonably in Control

Reasonably Able to
Appreciate Consequences

Not Reasonably Able to
Appreciate Consequences

1.
Punishable

2.
Detainable
and punishable

Not Reasonably in Control

3.
Detainable
and punishable

4.
Detainable
and punishable

The only difference among the quadrants is that those in the first
quadrant are punished only and not detained.
On the other hand, suppose that we give up the presupposition that
responsibility requires control. Then those in the third quadrant are
responsible for what they do, and that explains why they may be
punished. Since responsibility still requires awareness, however, those in
the second and fourth quadrants are not punishable. But if the distinction
between the first and third quadrants does not consist in the
responsibility of those in the first group, the question becomes why the
two groups should be distinguished at all. If those who are responsible
for what they do may be both punished and detained, then why not
punish and detain those in the first group? That is, why not preventive
detention for those who are able to control their behavior?
Precisely this question has arisen in the recent terrorism litigation.
In Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush,33 the District Court asked itself
whether a citizen said to have plotted terrorist activity might be
indefinitely detained. It answered the question in the affirmative, citing
the Hendricks case and others: "[I]nsofar as the [petitioner's] argument
assumes that indefinite confinement of one not convicted of a crime is
per se unconstitutional, that assumption is simply wrong." 34 If indeed
terrorists and others in control of their behavior are to be subject to
indefinite detention on the basis of future dangerousness, that suggests
the following simplification of our matrix.

33. 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569, 590-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd on reh 'g sub nom. Padilla ex rel.
Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd,Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
34. Id. at 591.
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Reasonably in Control
Not Reasonably in Control

Reasonably Able to
Appreciate Consequences

Not Reasonably Able to
Appreciate Consequences

1.
Detainable
and punishable

2.
Detainable
but not punishable

3.
Detainable
and punishable

4.
Detainable
but not punishable

The attempt to rationalize the sex predator statutes by rejecting either
presupposition would have significant implications for whatever reasons
we might offer for refusing to indefinitely detain those who can
understand and control their behavior and for refusing to punish those
who cannot.
It may be that we are at a point at which we are prepared to accept,
for example, the possible indefinite detention of any persistent offender,
even one who could appreciate the consequences of his actions and
control them. Certainly we would not be the only nation to have gone
down that road. It is, however, out of kilter with our Anglo-Saxon
traditions, 35 and we should be clear about where the road leads. The first
and most important point is that none of the protections that the
Constitution provides for those threatened with punishment apply to
those threatened with preventive detention, for, under the Constitution,
preventive detention (so long as it is properly administered) is not
punishment but regulation. 36 That means that double jeopardy, the
presumption of innocence, the right to confront an accuser, 37 and other
35. See Ann Woolner, If Only More People Saw Justices Rein in the President, L.A. Bus. J.,
July 12, 2004, at 47 (quoting United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who stated that
"[t]he very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been
freedom from indefinite detention at the will of the executive").
36. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987); cf Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S.
364, 370 (1986); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1963). The right to a writ
of habeas corpus transcends the distinction between punishment and regulation. A citizen is entitled
to know why he is being detained. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1) (2002) (stating that "[i]n a detention
order ....the judicial officer shall ... include ...a written statement of the reasons for the
detention"). Once that right is satisfied, however, the various rights surrounding punishment do not
kick in unless he is being punished-that is, unless he has been convicted and sentenced. Kennedy,
372 U.S. at 167.
37. See, for example, the case of Abu Ahmed Ali, an American citizen detained as a possible
terrorist, whose lawyers argued to the court that they did not even have the right to know the legal
theory on which their client was being detained, let alone the evidence supporting his detention.
Injustice, in Secret, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2005, at A26. The courts might decide that Ali is indeed
entitled to know the charges against him, but, if so, it will be on the basis of the right to a writ of
habeas corpus. Once he knows the charges, he will still not be entitled to the privileges surrounding
punishment (like the right to confront one's accusers) unless his attorneys can make the case that he
is being punished and not simply detained as a dangerous person. Allen, 478 U.S. at 372
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constitutional protections do not apply, except indirectly. 38 It also means
that our uneasiness about things like proportionality, not clearly found in
the Constitution 39 but deeply rooted in our feelings about the fair limits
of punishment, can be set aside. For proportionality of sentence is not an
issue in preventive detention; detention is for as long as it takes to make
sure the offender is no longer dangerous. On the other side, we should be
clear about the implications for the law of insanity. Up to now,
commitment of the insane has required a showing of both mental illness
and dangerousness. 40 An insanity acquittee who either regains his sanity
or who remains insane but is no longer dangerous must, under current
law, be released.4 1 But commitment is nothing other than preventive
detention. If we permit the indefinite detention of those who are legally
sane, then there is no reason in principle to release insanity acquittees
once they have regained their sanity, so long as they remain dangerous.42
II.

Two RESPONSES

Many commentators are unwilling to accept these consequences.
Stephen Morse, for one, has argued that the combination of punishment
and preventive detention cannot be justified. But Morse locates the
problem in what once would have seemed an unusual place: in the
supposition that it makes sense to talk about people lacking control over
their intentional actions. Morse believes that the idea of control
difficulties is incoherent, and that those whose only defense is a claim
that, though they understood what they were doing and that it was
wrong, they could not help themselves, are responsible for what they do
and should be punished and not preventively detained.4 3 According to

("[I]nvoluntary commitment does not trigger the entire range of criminal procedural protections.");
see also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 167.
38. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 368. Although particular statutes may provide particular protections
for those facing detention, the fact that these protections are not constitutional means that they are
subject to prevailing opinions. Id. at 372, 375.
39. Although the Court has found a proportionality requirement when it comes to the death
penalty, whether there is such a requirement in noncapital cases is a subject of some uncertainty
after the divided opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 957, 959 (1991).
40. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 362 (1983)).
41. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
42. At this point, the holding in Crane, as well as the probable result of a constitutional test of
the GBMI laws, both come into conflict with the holding in Foucha v. Louisiana, in which the
Court declared that an insanity acquittee who had regained his sanity had to be released. Foucha,
504 U.S. at 80.
43. See Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger,Flightfrom Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
L. 250, 258-59 (1998) [hereinafter Morse, Fear of Danger]. See generally Stephen J. Morse,
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Morse, the only excuses that derive from the actor's mental condition are
excuses based on cognitive defects:
[T]he lack of the capacity for rationality is the central and normatively
proper non-responsibility criterion in both law and ordinary morality.
It can be applied workably and fairly and leaves room for moral,
political, and legal debate about the appropriate limits of responsibility.
The "control" language used in Hendricks, Crane, and other cases and
statutes is metaphorical and better understood in terms of rationality
defects. 4
According to Morse, the idea that some people "can't help
themselves" is an idea that doesn't make any sense at all.45 Let's call this
proposition, that lack of control doesn't make any sense, the assumption
of perfect liberty.46 More precisely, the assumption is this: Those who
act intentionally, unless they suffer from a defect of rationality, act
freely and are responsible for what they do. According to that
assumption, our matrix ought to look like this:
Reasonably Able to
Appreciate Consequences

Not Reasonably Able to
Apreciate Consequences

1.

2.
Detainable
but not punishable

Punishable

Categories three and four, comprising those who understand what they
are doing but are unable to control their behavior and those who do not
understand what they are doing and cannot control their behavior,
simply drop out.
Christopher Slobogin follows Morse in this.47 But Slobogin does
not agree with Morse about what should be done with sex offenders who

Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1619-34 (1994) [hereinafter Morse, Culpability
and Control].
44. Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and IrrationalPeople, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025,
1064 (2002) [hereinafter Morse, Uncontrollable Urges].
45. For my argument against this position, see Corrado, supra note 32 passim; Michael
Corrado, Addiction and Causation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 913 passim (2000). The difference

between a willed action that is within the control of the actor and a willed action that is not depends
upon whether the willing itself is within the control of the actor. Moreover, Slobogin argues that if
lack of control is unhelpful, Morse's notion of irrationality is not helpful either. See Christopher
Slobogin, A JurisprudenceofDangerousness,98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 41 (2003).

46.

For a defense of this assumption, see generally Rogers Albritton, Freedom of Will and

Freedom of Action, 59 PROC. & ADDRESSEs AM. PHIL. ASS'N 239 (1985), reprinted in FREE WILL

408 (Gary Watson ed., 2d ed. 2003).
47. Slobogin, supranote 45, at 36-38.
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simply refuse to obey the law. More generally, he is concerned about the
offender who, though he understands and appreciates the consequences
of his actions and could do otherwise if he chose, simply refuses to obey
the law.48 For example, what about the terrorist so committed to a
political or religious cause that he will not be deterred by any threat of
punishment? The suicide bomber, whether he straps explosives to his
waist and aims to blow up people in the street or commandeers an
airplane and aims to fly it into a building, is the paradigm example. The
suicide bomber cannot be deterred by the threat of death, the threat of
imprisonment, or the threat of reprisals against his community. The
danger that the suicide bomber creates cannot be reduced to an
appropriate level by the threat of punishment.49
Under the assumption of perfect liberty, Slobogin would assimilate
the case of the compulsive sex predator to the case of the suicide
bomber: both are perfectly free to do otherwise, but neither will do
otherwise. He has refined the notion of undeterrability and made it the
keystone of his theory of detention.5 ° Unlike Morse, Slobogin would
permit the detention of sex predators and criminals like them, provided
that they were genuinely undeterrable, and it follows from his theory that
the terrorist, at least the terrorist who like the suicide bomber will not be
deterred, may be detained as well. 51 Detention is justified whenever "the
individual lacks the capacity or lacks the willingness to adhere to
5 2 For Slobogin, the matrix would perhaps look
society's basic norms.
53
this:
like
something
Deterrable

Not Deterrable

la.
Punishable

2a.
Detainable

Slobogin rejects the control standard adopted in Crane54 on grounds
identical to those that persuaded Morse,5 5 though he finds the
48. Id.at 40-42.
49. Id. at 4, 46.
50. See id at 40-46.
51. See id. at 42, 46.
52. Id. at 29.
53. I use the qualifier "perhaps," in presenting the matrix for the following reason: It is clear
from Slobogin's article that the person who is not undeterrable is entitled to be punished and should
not be preventively detained. See id. at 29-30. It is also clear that the person who is undeterrable
may be preventively detained (subject to appropriate restrictions). See id. What is not clear from
Slobogin's article is whether the person who is undeterrable may also be subjected to punishment.
54. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
55. See Slobogin, supranote 45, at 36-37.
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irrationality standard accepted by Morse to be troublesome as well, 56 and
would apparently supplant both with a single undeterrability standard.57
He would maintain such things as sex-predator legislation, though with
such safeguards as increasingly heavy burdens for the state to meet as
detention drags out. 58 He argues that it is the undeterrability of certain
offenders that justifies the use of detention against them. Although the
ordinary offender is protected by his humanity against such treatment,
and is entitled to punishment instead, 59 the undeterrable offender loses
his essential humanity and thus may be detained. 60 He in effect becomes
a "harmful animal.",61 "[T]hrough punishment 'the criminal is honoured
as a rational being,"' he says, quoting Hegel. 62 It is an insult to the
autonomy of the ordinary criminal to try to prevent him from
committing crimes in the future by detaining him; it presumes that he
does not have the capacity to choose the right path or, having the
capacity, that he will not choose it. It denies his "status as a selfgoverning, autonomous human being." 63 But "preventive detention
eludes the dehumanization objection if the government... can show he
will exercise his autonomy in the anti-social direction regardless of
circumstance." 64 That is, it is not degrading to preventively detain
someone who cannot understand what he is doing, and it is not
degrading to preventively detain someone who though he does
understand and though he can obey will not, because both are
undeterrable and consequently neither one is entitled to the dignity
accorded to an autonomous human being.
But what exactly does it mean to say that someone is undeterrable?
Slobogin attempts to define undeterrability in psychological terms
familiar in the criminal law:
This notion is most meaningfully expressed not in terms of lack of
control, irrationality, or the "likeliness" of being deterred, but rather in
terms of two other psychological tendencies: either (1) unawareness
that one is engaging in criminal conduct; or (2) extreme recklessness

56. Id. at41.
57. See id.
at 42.
58. See id.
at 62.
59. Id.at 29.
60. Id.at 29-30.
61. Id.at 30.
62. Id. at 29 (quoting G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 126 (Allen
W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge U. Press 1991) (1821)).
63. Id.at 27.
64. Id.at 45-46.
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with respect to the prospect
of serious loss of liberty or death resulting
65
from the criminalconduct.
According to Slobogin:
[T]he formulation proposed here would encompass people who are
lacking in autonomy due to mental disability and the like, as well as
that small category of people who are not insane but who can
nonetheless be denied the right to punishment because of their
manifest obliviousness
to society's most important criminal
66
prohibitions.

Preventive detention is appropriate for people in both those groups.
Those who are deterrable, on the other hand, are entitled to punishment
instead of detention.67
Slobogin says that "[t]he old policeman-at-the-elbow test puts the
matter succinctly." 68 In other words, if the offender is willing to commit
the crime in spite of the fact that there is a policeman looking over his
shoulder and apprehension is certain, then he is undeterrable. I agree that
such a person would qualify as undeterrable if anyone would, but it is
not a test of undeterrability. Since all that is necessary, Slobogin admits,
is that the offender be "extremely reckless" about apprehension and
punishment, punishment doesn't have to be certain, as it would be with a
policeman standing by. It is enough if the criminal is willing to act
despite a sizeable risk that he will be apprehended and punished.
III.

SOME THOUGHTS

ON VOLITIONAL DEFECTS AND
UNDETERRABILITY

A.

Undeterrability

Slobogin groups undeterrable sex predators with undeterrable
terrorists because he accepts Morse's position on the lack-of-control
standard. He believes that lack of control makes no sense, and so there is
no difference in capability and responsibility between the sex predator
and the terrorist. I believe there are a number of problems with his
position.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.at 42.
Id. at 35.
See id. at 5.
Id.at 43.
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1. "The Undeterrable Offender Loses Her Humanity"
The first problem is this: Why does the determined criminal, the
one who risks even death to accomplish his goal, lose his humanity?
Whatever the metaphor of losing one's humanity may mean, it would
hardly seem to apply to those who act out of motives we admire, those
who act out of a sense of honor and with great bravery. And yet
Slobogin's theory would seem to mean that some such people are less
than human, are not entitled to punishment, and may be preventively
detained to keep them from causing harm in the future. Think of the
civilly disobedient. Think, for example, of the young protestor who
broke Israeli law by trying to obstruct a bulldozer and who was run over
and killed for her trouble. 69 Perhaps she did not intend to suffer death;
perhaps it was all an accident. But would we have thought less of her if
we found out that in fact she had known that death was likely and
confronted it willingly to make her point? I suggest that the opposite is
true. Whatever our political beliefs, we would have been forced to
admire her. Yet I believe that, on Slobogin's view, she has lost her
humanity; indeed, would the act of the driver who killed her be a
punishable act if what Slobogin says is true?
And how would you distinguish the terrorist, whom we now claim
is not protected by the rules of war, from the extraordinary prisoner of
war who is actually willing to fight and die for the sake of his country? I
suggest that, far from losing their humanity, some of the people we most
admire fall into these groups; they represent the highest sort of
humanity. And if humanity means that indefinite preventive detention is
inappropriate, as Slobogin suggests, 70 then it would be inappropriate at
least in the most admirable of these cases.7 ' But there is no morally
69. The victim was a 23-year-old American, Rachel Corrie. There are conflicting stories
about whether the killing was deliberate or merely accidental, and about whether, at the last
moment, she refused to move or simply slipped and fell. Israeli Bulldozer Kills American Protester,
CNN.COM, Mar. 25, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/16/rafah.death/index.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
70. See Slobogin, supranote 45, at 29-30.
71. Kant discusses the interesting (though now unfashionable) case of the young military
officer whose honor has been challenged and who kills another in a duel. IMMANUEL KANT,
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 143-44 (John Ladd trans., 2d ed. Hackett Publ'g 1999)

(1797). The officer was clearly willing to suffer death to avenge his honor and so cannot be deterred
by the threat of punishment. Id. Far from supposing that he should be preventively detained to
prevent a recurrence, Kant argues that the state does not even have the authority to justly punish
him, because the state is responsible, in a way, for this outcome of an insult to honor (perhaps
because the state does not adequately punish insults to honor). Id.at 144; see also CESARE
BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 73-74 (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1963)

(1764) ("[T]he best method of preventing this crime is to punish the aggressor, namely, the one who
has given occasion for the duel, and to acquit him who, without personal fault, has been obliged to
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neutral way, I would suggest, to distinguish between those resisters we
admire and those terrorists we abhor. If one loses her humanity on the
single ground that she is undeterrable, so does the other. I would argue
that neither does, neither the good nor the evil. We might be willing to
say in this metaphorical language that one who, like the sex predator,
lacks the human capacity to control her behavior, lacks an essential
ingredient of humanity. But one who, in the face of great danger, simply
refuses to obey, is doing something human and perhaps more than
human. If it honors humanity to punish their behavior, then they should
be punished. On the terms of his own argument, then, Slobogin should
reject preventive detention of the sane-that is, he should reject what I
have called pure preventive detention.
2. "Extreme Recklessness is a Mark of Undeterrability"
The second problem has to do with the definition of undeterrability.
The first category of undeterrability, remember, includes those who are
unaware that they are engaging in criminal conduct. The second includes
those who are extremely reckless with respect to a serious loss of liberty
or death resulting from the criminal conduct. The problem is that the
second category draws no clear line between the ordinary criminal and
the sort of person that I believe Slobogin would like this category to
include.
Every criminal takes a chance that he will be apprehended and
punished. How great must the chance be before he moves from the
category of the punishable into the category of the detainable? Slobogin
says that he must be willing to run a significant risk of a substantial
punishment. 72 But how much is significant, and how much is
substantial? The punishments that are risked by criminals are sometimes
very substantial indeed. In those cases, how great must the risk be before
it is significant? Do we determine the amount of risk based upon the
criminal's calculations, or by using more objective measures? Using the
standards of the criminal law, we would have to say that causing a
twenty-percent chance of death or of life imprisonment would be more
than reckless; it would be something close to depraved-heart
indifference. Should every criminal who believes that the chance of
defend what the existing laws do not assure him, that is, opinion."). It is not that he is beneath
punishment; he will have to be punished, but the punishment remains unjust. KANT, supra, at 14344. The only case in which Kant seems willing to favor something like preventive detention for the
sane is the case, oddly, of bestiality, for which, having chosen to leave the human race by his act,
the offender is to be put outside society. Id. at 172 (supplementary remarks).
72. See Slobogin, supra note 45, at 43-44.
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death or of life in prison for 73his crime is twenty percent or more be
subject to indefinite detention?
The problem is not so much coming up with the right figures as it is
in explaining why those a bit on one side of the line should be subject to
punishment only, while those a bit on the other side should be subject to
indefinite detention. The difference between punishment and detention is
not a difference in degree; it is a difference in kind. If Slobogin is right,
it depends upon the humanity of the offender. But whatever it is in us
that "humanity" stands for, it can't be something that disappears as the
actor's tolerance for risk edges up a bit. And beyond that, of course, is
the enormous potential for abuse.
B.

Volitional Defects

But the most serious problem with Slobogin's position is a problem
that it shares with Morse's theory: the assumption of perfect liberty. The
notion that some people cannot control their behavior, have great
difficulty in controlling their behavior, or "can't help themselves," is a
notion with a foundation in common sense-as Morse himself
admits 74-and it seems to me that we should be cautious about
dismissing any such deeply rooted notions, particularly when the
arguments for dismissal are based upon premises less secure and less
well founded in evidence than the notion to be rejected. The idea of
control difficulties, the idea that people who know full well what they
are doing sometimes cannot help themselves, shows a kind of
stubbornness. It will not easily be put down, as its re-emergence in the
new legislation shows. And even if we were able to do away with the
notion of control difficulties or volitional disabilities it would require a
more thorough-going revamping of our system of
criminal justice than
75
Morse and others may be willing to countenance.
Still, it is worth taking the time to discover why the idea that
control difficulties or volitional disabilities simply do not exist is
popular among legal theorists. Morse is perhaps the most distinguished

73. And what should we say about the person who, when provoked severely enough, will
disregard a high risk of punishment? The criminal justice system that we have mitigates his
punishment. See Rachel J. Lirtman, Adequate Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the
Deconstrution of Free Will, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1127, 1154-56 (1997). See generally id. at 1154-63
(discussing the definition and history of provocation as mitigation of punishment for crimes).
Should he be indefinitely detained instead? Detained only when he is provoked?
74. See Morse, UncontrollableUrges, supra note 44, at 1034-35, 1059-60.
75. See Michael L. Corrado, The Abolition of Punishment, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 257, 270
(2001).
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legal psychologist to have taken this position. Over the years he has
refined a series of arguments to support his conclusion that the only
excuses that make sense are those based on cognitive or rationality
defects. His writing on the subject has been too extensive for me to try to
consider all of his arguments here, so I will confine myself to some of
the more important and influential ones.
1. "All Human Behavior Either is Voluntary or is Not Action at
All"
All human behavior is either willed or not willed by the actor.7 6
Behavior that is not willed is not action at all, according to Morse,77 and
of course the agent may not be responsible for such behavior. For
example, our movements when we thrash about in our sleep are not
willed. Spasms are not willed. Unless the actor performed an action
earlier knowing that it might cause the thrashing or the spasm, she is not
responsible for it. 78 But sleep movements and spasms are not the sort of
behavior that is generally at issue when the claim is made that someone
cannot control himself. The question is whether there may be actionswilled movements-that are not within the agent's control. The answer,
according to Morse, is that all genuine action is willed, and, if it is
willed, it is voluntary. 79 Just as the idea of unwilled action doesn't make
sense, so the idea of action that is willed but involuntary doesn't make
sense either. None of the behavior that we seek to excuse as not within
the agent's control-the actions of the sex predator, for example-are
unwilled, and therefore all such actions are voluntary. Unless they are
the product of an irrational mind, according to Morse, the agent is
responsible for them.80 The compulsive sex offender is not acting
blindly; what he does he does intentionally. He is in control of his
behavior and is accountable for it.

76. If you are uncomfortable with the expression, "an act willed by the actor," substitute for it
the expression, "an act initiated by the actor." I don't think anything of significance will be lost. See
Corrado, supranote 32, at 1196-97.
77. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 44, at 1055-56.
78. Of course, even if we did something earlier that caused the unwilled movements, we
might still not be responsible for them. It would depend upon whether we were aware that the
unwilled movements would follow or that they might follow. Cf Stephen J. Morse, Hooked on
Hype: Addiction and Responsibility, 19 L. & PHIL. 3, 42-43 (2000) [hereinafter Morse, Hooked on

Hype] (discussing how drug addicts should be responsible for "diminishing their own rationality" at
the time they committed a crime).
79. See Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 44, at 1055-60; Morse, Culpability and
Control,supra note 43, at 1591-92.
80. See Morse, Culpabilityand Control, supranote 43, at 1591-93, 1599, 1605.
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There are two problems with this argument. The first is that the
mere fact that an action is the result of an act of will does not entail that
it is voluntary. For example, if an agent is hypnotized, and while under
the influence, chooses to do something that he would not otherwise have
done, then (if hypnotism operates as we commonly believe it does) the
8
agent could not have chosen otherwise, and his act is not voluntary. 1
Yet it was willed by him. A type of thought experiment is also
sometimes used to make this point. If a scientist is able, through a device
wired into the brain of a subject, to make the subject choose one thing
rather than another, then though there is choice-and willing-the
resulting act may be against the actor's will.82 But though it is against

the actor's will, in the loose and popular sense, it is nevertheless true that
the actor willed it; the scientist may have controlled the actor's will, but
it was precisely the actor's willing that produced the action. This is a
purely conceptual point: it is not the willing of an act that makes it
voluntary; it is the willing of it while at the same time being able to will
otherwise.8 3 In the case of hypnosis, and in the case of our imaginary
scientist, it is the "unwilling" actor who does the willing. Morse has a
response to this argument, and I will return to this point in Section 2.
The more important objection to this first argument is that it is
irrelevant to most cases in which lack of control is used as an excuse. It
is perfectly true that the sex predator cannot claim that his actions are
literally involuntary. Not only are the actions of the sex predator willed,
the sex predator is able to will otherwise. His acts are voluntary. The real
question is whether acting otherwise is extremely difficult for him,
difficult in a way that would incline us not to hold him responsible for
avoiding it. It makes perfectly good sense to suppose that an agent might
be free to choose otherwise and might at the same time find it
extraordinarily difficult to make that other choice. For example, the
severely addicted person may find it so difficult to do otherwise that we
find it understandable that in spite of severe penalties he persists in his
habit.
81. The Model Penal Code recognizes hypnotism as a defense. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.01(2)(c) (1962).
82. The issue here is not whether such a procedure is possible, but whether it is selfcontradictory. There is nothing inconsistent with the idea of an intention being implanted and then
the actor being caused to act upon that intention.
83. For those familiar with Frankfurt's work on alternate possibilities, a better way to put this
might be: willing it without being caused to will it. See Corrado, supra note 32, at 1222-27
(discussing Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 829
(1969)). But see John Martin Fischer, Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism, in CONTOURS OF AGENCY:
ESSAYS ON THEMES FROM HARRY FRANKFURT 1 (Sarah Buss & Lee Overton eds., 2002).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss1/5

20

Corrado: Responsibility and Control
2005]

RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL

If there are such cases, as I think there are, then at least in the more
extreme such cases two things relevant to the question of punishment
become clear: (a) we are less inclined in such cases to blame the actor
for what he does; and (b) the state cannot control the risk the person
presents by threatening him with punishment. Morse has an answer to
this as well, and I will deal with that in Section 3.
2.

"The Mere Fact that a Willing is Caused by Some Prior Event
Beyond the Actor's Control Does Not Entail that the Agent is
Not Responsible for It"
I suggested above that a willed action might not be a voluntary
action when the willing was caused by something beyond the actor's
control. Morse, following Michael Moore in this, argues that the mere
fact that a willing is caused does not entail that it is involuntary or that
we are not responsible for it. 84 This is a perfectly respectable position in
philosophy, called compatibilism, 85 but it is controversial and it requires
an argument. It appears to contradict one of the assumptions upon which
our notion of justice is founded-the idea that we are responsible for our
behavior only when it is entirely within our control, and only when we
could have done otherwise8 6-and so it cannot be simply asserted. It
must be backed up with argument. Otherwise it would seem to be as
plain as could be that if an actor is caused to act by something outside
his control he is simply not responsible for what he does.
As far as I can make out, Morse has only one argument. If we
believe that an act's being caused by something beyond the actor's
control means that it should be excused, then we have this problem:
Since all of our choices are (or may well be) caused by things beyond
our control, that means that all actions would have to be excused. Since
the aim of those who would excuse uncontrollable behavior would be
defeated by a showing that everything is excused, something we may

84.

See Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 43, at 1592-94; see also Michael S.

Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1128-48 (1985).

85. Compatibilism is the view that causation is compatible with responsibility. It is rejected
by the determinist (or hard determinist) who believes that all actions are caused and that, therefore,
no one is responsible for what he does, and also rejected by the metaphysical libertarian, who
believes that we are responsible for some of our actions, and therefore, not all actions are caused.
See Corrado, supra note 31, at 472-75.
86. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 45, at 27-28. For those who are aware of the work of
Frankfurt and who believe for that reason that the ability to do otherwise cannot be a condition of
responsibility, the gist of the traditional notion of justice includes the claim that the actor was not
caused to do what he did. Corrado, supranote 32, at 1222-27.
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presume they don't want, the contention
that causation provides an
87
excuse must be rejected by them.
This is a nice ad hominem argument. 88 If Morse is right, the
proponent of a causal theory of excuse ends up having to excuse
everyone, when all he set out to do was to excuse those whose actions
are caused by something outside their control. If the proponent cannot
accept the conclusion that everything is excused, he must reject the
premise that causation excuses. There are a number of reasons why the
argument doesn't work, however. In the first place, it depends upon the
additional premise that everything, including human action, is caused by
events outside the actor's control. This is a premise that is rejected by
some non-compatibilist philosophers. 89 I do not mean to argue for its
rejection, but only to point out one reason why the argument may not
work against Morse's opponent. The opponent may reject the
assumption that all action is caused by things outside our control-and
he may be willing to concede that if he is wrong about that, then indeed
all actions should be excused.
In the second place, though, the argument would seem to be
irrelevant here, as I suggested above. It is difficult to figure out just who
Morse's opponent is in this particular controversy about causation.
When the defense attorney claims that her client cannot help himself (or
now when the prosecutor claims that the defendant sex predator cannot
help himself), and that only death will stop him from somehow
committing his violent crimes, she is not claiming that the offender's
action should be excused because it is caused. She is not claiming that he
is an automaton. She is claiming instead that the offender is unlike other
human beings in having to make choices that are simply very difficult
for him to make, and that perhaps conforming his actions to the law is so
difficult for him that he ought to be excused and committed (or, now,
preventively detained after his prison term). I will take up Morse's
answer to this position in Section 3.

87. Morse, Culpabilityand Control,supra note 43, at 1592.
88. Not all ad hominem arguments are suspect. Where, as here, the opponent's own premises
can be turned against him, the argument may be perfectly sound and relevant.
89. See, e.g., RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, PERSON AND OBJECT: A METAPHYSICAL STUDY 6162 (1976); PETER VAN INWAGEN, AN ESSAY ON FREE WILL 162-82 (1983); MICHAEL J.
ZIMMERMAN, AN ESSAY ON HUMAN ACTION 221 (1984); Peter van Inwagen, Logic and the Free
Will Problem, 16 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 277, 289 n.3 (1990).
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3. "The Fact that Someone has Strong Desires, Even Very Strong
Desires, Does Not Relieve Him of Responsibility for What He
Does"
Those who argue for a control or volitional excuse, and those who
write the sex-predator laws, assume that some individuals are driven by
strong impulses-cravings-and find it difficult to control their
behavior. But, says Morse, we all have certain strong desires. 90 Those
desires do not literally compel us to act one way or the other, and they
do not relieve us of responsibility for our behavior. 9' Acting upon a
desire may be irrational, and if it is irrational then it may be excused.
That would be a cognitive excuse. But the fact that a desire is strong
does not by itself make acting upon it irrational. We all have strong
desires and when we act upon them we are usually responsible for what
we do. So if Morse is right, the sex predator's strong desires-his
cravings---do not excuse
his actions nor put him beyond the reach of the
92
threat of punishment.
But what about the addict, the paradigm example of someone who,
though he knows what he is doing, knows the consequences, and knows
that it is illegal, continues to engage in his habit? Again, this is nothing
but a case of someone with a strong desire, according to Morse.93 His
practice is rational; he compares the pain he will suffer if he does not
take his substance of choice with the pleasure or lack of pain he will feel
if he does take it, taking into account the consequences if caught and the
chance of getting caught, and he makes his decision to take the
substance. If the actor really could not control his behavior, then he
would engage in it even with a policeman at his elbow; but no addict
would do that, Morse speculates, and so addicts really are in control of
their behavior. If the pain that he would suffer if the substance were
withheld were truly great, we might be willing to grant him an excuse.
But the pain is never that great, in fact. And in any case, the excuse
would be based on a notion of fairness: it simply wouldn't be fair to
force him to experience that sort of pain. Nevertheless, the addict is as
much in control of his behavior as the person who weighs the

90.
91.
92.
note 43,
93.

See Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 43, at 1600.
See id. at 1600-02; Morse, Fear of Danger, supra note 43, at 263-64.
Morse, Fear of Danger, supra note 43, at 263-64; Morse, Culpability and Control, supra
at 1600-02.
Morse, Hooked on Hype, supra note 78 at 28. And for a similar view, see Alan Schwartz,

Views ofAddiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L. REV. 509, 531 (1989).
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alternatives and chooses going to the movies over staying at home to
work. And the same, according to Morse, is true of the sex predator.9 4
But having granted that the addict's behavior and the sex predator's
behavior are voluntary, we need not be persuaded by the example of the
policeman at the elbow that it is responsible behavior. We know that
although it may be true that neither the addict nor the sex offender would
engage in criminal conduct if apprehension and punishment were
certain, the real question is how much of a risk each is willing to take.
The person who is willing to take the risk when the probability is all but
certain is either someone who simply values his object more than he
fears punishment, or else someone who finds it extremely hard to resist
pursuing his object. All action is motivated by desire, but there is a
world of difference between the suicide bomber whose desires are more
or less coherent and who will persist in spite of the near certainty of
punishment, and the severely addicted person who fears punishment,
despises her habit, and will regret giving in after it is done, but who acts
upon the stronger immediate desire for the drug nevertheless. Although
the addict gives in to her stronger desire, there is nothing irrational
about her behavior. She understands the facts, and she can draw the
proper conclusions. She may be fully aware that her desire for her drug
of choice is overpowering the desire for a more satisfactory life overall
and the desire to avoid punishment. She risks punishment to get what
she wants, even though she knows that she will be sorry if she is in fact
punished, much like the person who risks a great deal of money on a
lottery may know that he will in fact be sorry for having done it if he
loses. The more certain the punishment that she is willing to risk, the
stronger her addiction, and the less she is in control of her behavior.
I conclude that the case against control or volitional difficulties, at
least as Morse has made it, is not persuasive. Certainly these are difficult
notions to apply, and they are as difficult to measure as are
"recklessness" and "intent" and many other criminal law concepts. But
they do have some clear applications, as in cases in which the actor
persistently acts against what he perceives to be his own interest and
regrets his actions, perhaps to the extent of contemplating suicide. These
are the marks, for example, of the addict.95

94.

Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 44, at 1057-58.

95.

Morse admits the existence of cases that in common parlance we would call "control

cases," and he admits that they ought to be excused (and perhaps detained). But he misleadingly
describes such cases thus:
[S]uppose the predation has been frequent, it has previously led to conviction and

imprisonment, and incarceration is a profoundly unpleasant experience for the predator.
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To be clear, I am not arguing that sex offenders are not responsible
for what they do. Whether they are or not, the point is that there is a
category of behavior that takes an individual beyond the reach of
punishment, and it has nothing to do with deficiencies of a cognitive or
emotional sort. Whether any sex predators fit this description is another
question. There are disabilities that affect our ability to pursue certain
ends, not by making them impossible, but by making them very difficult
to attain. In cases of that sort, I maintain what Morse denies, that the
state may not be able to reduce an individual's dangerousness by
threatening punishment, and thus preventive detention may be
warranted.
IV.

MAKING SENSE OF CONTROL DIFFICULTIES

If it is our purpose to defend the possibility of control difficulties, it
is not enough to show that important arguments againstthe coherence of
control difficulties fall through. It is necessary also to show that control
difficulties can be given a plausible meaning. In this Part, I will offer a
way to make sense of such difficulties, and try to show why those who
lack control (as I define it) should be treated differently. 96 To show that
control difficulties make sense is not the same, of course, as showing
that there are individuals who suffer from such difficulties. It is not my
intention to try to answer such questions, but only to move the
discussion forward by showing that an important element in determining
punishability, namely control, cannot be ruled out a priori.
Before starting on a definition of control difficulties, however, there
is another equally important task that cannot be neglected. So often in
Such a history is precisely the type that justifies a recognized psychiatric
diagnosis.... The predator may have no reasonable explanation for why he did not tie
himself to the mast, did not take the preventive measures necessary to avoid hated
imprisonment.
Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 44, at 1073-74. Morse insists on calling such cases, "cases
of irrationality," so that the fact that these cases call forth our willingness to excuse (and perhaps to
detain) does not enlarge the list of excuses beyond the cognitive. But to call these cases "cases of
irrationality" stretches the concept of irrationality beyond reasonable bounds. Someone who cannot
connect premises with conclusions is irrational. Someone who cannot properly take in information
is irrational in a derivative sense. But someone who knows what he is doing and what follows from
it is not irrational in any strict sense. One who though he knows what he is doing and knows that
something unpleasant follows from it, but cannot control his impulse to do it, has a control problem
and not any clear sort of rationality problem. No doubt the behavior of predators in such cases is
irrational from an objective standpoint, but that is because the actor's behavior does not follow from
what he knows he ought to do.
96. 1 want to make clear that I am proposing the definitions in this section as a way to begin
discussion, not as a way to conclude it.
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these discussions all the difficulties that are commonly said to deprive an
actor of responsibility are crammed into the category of irrationality; yet
rarely are we told precisely what rationality or irrationality is for the
purposes of the law. Every condition that undermines responsibility is
said to be a rationality defect; and then the category of rationality is so
loosely defined that every troublesome case can be coerced into it. For
example, a commentator might insist that addicts are fully in control of
their behavior and then, when confronted with cases of addicts who are
obviously not in control of their behavior, might insist that they suffer
from a defect of rationality-"murky" thinking, perhaps.9 7 We cannot
make headway in separating out control difficulties on one side until we
have pinned down just what we mean by a defect of rationality on the
other. Precision is needed to prevent the slight of hand by which we are
persuaded first that all exculpatory psychological conditions, including
extreme addiction and the more extreme compulsions, are defects of
rationality, and then that compulsives and addicts are not to be excused
because they do not suffer either from a defect of perception or a defect
of inference. If we are clear about what we mean by rationality, it will
become evident that some psychological difficulties are not difficulties
of reason.
Of course we could do it the other way around. If, for example, we
accept the notion proposed by some philosophers that rationality
includes not only perception and inference, but that desires themselves
can also be called rational or irrational, then irrationality might include
both cognitive and volitional disabilities. But for legal purposes, that
would be to gloss over the problem at issue here and not to solve it.
There is a cash value to this distinction in legal contexts; the law of
insanity, for example, does not talk about "rationality" as such, but
rather about the ability to understand or to appreciate. Either way, we
arrive at the same conclusion. If we want to use rationality in the larger
sense, that's perfectly fine, but then we should enlarge the so-called
conditions of responsibility to include not only right perception and right
inference, but also right desire. We should, that is, recognize defects of
volition as one defect of rationality and consider whether addicts and
those who suffer from compulsions are not entitled to mitigation or
exculpation.
For the purposes of this Article, let's do it the first way and say that
rationality, at least as far as responsibility in the criminal law is
concerned, is the ability to take in and process information. Someone
97. See Morse, Hooked on Hype, supra note 78, at 42-43.
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who suffers from a defect of rationality or a cognitive defect and who,
because of that, should not be held responsible for his behavior is
someone who does not correctly understand the world around him, or
else does not draw correct conclusions from what he does understand.
More than that, it is a defect only if he is unable to understand the world
around him, or unable to draw correct conclusions from what he
observes-that is, only if his beliefs are not responsive to evidence. To
say that someone committed a crime only because he suffered a defect of
reason is to say this, as a first approximation:
1. He committed the crime;
2. If he had correctly appreciated the facts, and if he had correctly
drawn conclusions from the facts, he would not have had theprima
facie desire to perform the action that constituted the crime; and
3. No amount of evidence would have caused him to correct his
appreciation of the facts or his inferences.
The first and second clauses are intended to capture the fact that his
commission of the crime was due to a misapprehension of the facts and
what followed from the facts. Such misapprehension may or may not
excuse behavior, but it is not by itself tantamount to a defect of
rationality. Someone who fires at a paper target unaware that someone is
standing behind it would not have fired and killed the person behind it if
he had been aware of the facts. Someone who draws a wrong inference
from the facts he observes may likewise have an excuse, if the inference
is not negligent or reckless. But someone may fail to be deterred because
he underestimates the chance of apprehension and conviction, and in that
case he will not be excused.
The third clause is meant to introduce the idea of a defect: the
actor's beliefs cannot be changed by any evidence that it might have
been possible to adduce in the world as it stood at the time of the crime.
But the clause is obviously too strong. What the definition captures, as it
stands, is the idea of someone utterly out of touch with reality. Rarely
will someone be beyond the reach of all evidence. Nevertheless, we can
preserve what is important in the definition by talking about resistance
to evidence. A more appropriate definition, therefore, of someone who
committed a crime because of a substantial defect of reason would
include something like this as a third clause:

98. Every desire an actor has, whether he acts on it or not, is a primafaciedesire. Primafacie
desires will lose out to stronger desires. We might call a desire that trumps all competing prima
facie desires a desire all things considered.
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3(a). It would require unusual measures or an unreasonable amount of
evidence to cause him to correct his beliefs and inference patterns.
For example, someone who only with medication, or with a lengthy
course of therapy, could be made to see the truth would satisfy this
clause.
There is obviously a lot of play in the last clause, but that is as it
should be. Where the line should be drawn remains a matter of
community judgment. All that needs to be clear is that there comes a
point when resistance to evidence constitutes a defect that makes
punishment an unreasonable response to a crime.
It may be that not all beliefs are or should be responsive to
evidence. Perhaps religious beliefs are of that sort; perhaps beliefs about
morality are as well. If either religious or moral beliefs are outside the
realm of evidence, how should we treat someone whose crimes stem
from religious or moral beliefs which cannot be changed by evidence?
Suppose a Catholic kills an abortion doctor, believing that he has done
so to protect unborn children. Since there is no evidence that would have
caused him to be deterred by the threat of punishment, should he be
treated as suffering from a defect of rationality? In that case, the killer
fails the test of the first two clauses, but it requires us to limit the range
of facts that should be taken into consideration. It is not the case that, if
he had apprehended the facts correctly-facts other than those that are
the content of his motivating religious or moral beliefs-he would have
been deterred. Or, if there had been a fact that he misapprehended which
would have deterred him, it would have something to do with his
chances of apprehension, and unless there is reason to think that he is
genuinely irrational, he would no doubt have responded to evidence that
99
his beliefs about that were mistaken.
Can all the cases in which we say that someone was not responsible
for what he did be made to satisfy this definition? Unless we are
committed to maintaining the assumption of absolute liberty and will not
consider evidence to the contrary, I think we must concede that there are
cases that do not satisfy this definition, and yet in which we are inclined
to hold actors less responsible for what they do, or in which we are
inclined to deny legal responsibility altogether. The case of the severely
addicted person is one example. The addict is typically hyper-rational, at

99. For example, if he was apprehended because of a witness that he was not aware was there,
then either he would not have committed the crime on that occasion if he had been shown evidence

of it-and so fails the third part of the test, or he would not have been deterred by the facts-and so
fails the second part of the test.
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least when it comes to the subject matter of his addiction. There is no
reason to believe that he has false beliefs about the world, or that he is
incapable of drawing correct conclusions from what he perceives and
desires. It does not make sense, for example, that the addict desires the
benefits of a drug-free life more than he desires the drug at the time
when he takes it, but simply cannot make the inference from his greater
desire to the proper action. That would be an example of irrationality.
The better supposition seems to be that, at the time of taking the drug,
the addict desires the drug more than anything else.
It appears to be very difficult for the addict to avoid doing what he
does. Although the serious addict might not pursue his addiction with a
policeman standing at his elbow, he would certainly take very great risks
to that end, and indeed, it is conceivable that a person severely enough
addicted would do what he had to do with the policeman standing there.
There is no evidence that the compulsive criminal, such as the
compulsive sex offender, might suffer from the same intensity of
cravings-cravings that would cause him to risk almost certain
punishment-and indeed, it may be that the rational sex offender, unlike
the rational addict, never lacks ordinary control over his behavior. I
stress again that it is not my purpose to answer the empirical question.
But it is my purpose to argue that the picture of the compulsive addict
and the compulsive sex offender is one that can be made sense of. If I
am right, it is very much the province of the legislature, guided by
medical and scientific evidence, to determine whether there is a class of
offenders who are not in control of their behavior; it is the province of
the jury, guided by clinicians, to determine whether any particular
offender fits the picture. I have already argued that this picture is not
self-contradictory. It remains for me to show what sort of sense it might
make.
As a first approximation, I will begin with a definition of what it
means to be utterly unable to control behavior-that is, what it means to
be subject to an irresistible impulse. An irresistible impulse is a desirea craving-that would dominate other desires no matter what
circumstances the actor found himself in. Thus, to say that someone
committed a crime only because he suffered from a defect of volition or
control is to say this, again as a first approximation:
1. He committed the crime;
2. He did not suffer from a defect of rationality at the time; and
3. The desire that led him to perform the action that constituted the
crime would have done so, at that time, under any set of external
circumstances.
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In other words, his desire to perform the action trumped all his other
desires, including the desire to be free of punishment, and it would have
done so no matter what he
knew to be the case-even with a policeman
100
example.
for
at his elbow,
The question is whether there is anyone who satisfies both clauses,
whether there is anyone, that is, who can be said to be subject to
irresistible impulse. Notice that the definition does not describe a person
who is impervious to evidence. Granting that the person in question is
capable of perceiving the world more or less as it is, and of drawing
appropriate conclusions, this is a person who in every possible worldthat is, a person who, no matter what he believed-would attempt to
satisfy his desire. Such a person is beyond the reach not only of the
threat of punishment, but beyond the reach of punishment itself. Where
that is the case punishment cannot be justified, as I will argue below.
There is nothing in the definition that makes it inconsistent, and I have
argued above that such a person is conceivable. I reiterate that the
question whether there is or is not such a person is a red herring for our
enterprise. We are concerned not with the person who is utterly unable
to conform to the law, but with the person who finds it so difficult to
conform that he must be granted an excuse.
Let's try now to modify the definition to capture the idea of
someone who is largely but not entirely unable to control his behavior.
To say that someone commits a crime because he is substantiallyunable
to control his behavior and conform to the law would require a clause of
this sort:
3(a). The desire that led him to perform the action that constituted the
crime would have done so, at that time, in any but the most exceptional
circumstances.
Naturally, "most exceptional" would depend on the sense of the
community, as do many of the terms we find in the criminal law. The
question is not whether there is any consequence that might lead the
offender to change his behavior; the question is how severe the
consequence would have to be. The policeman at the elbow makes
punishment certain, and we may grant that even the severely addicted
will not ordinarily step out of line in those circumstances. I say
"ordinarily": I would think that it would sometimes depend upon how
long the addict believed that the policeman would remain at his elbow.

100. For a philosophical analysis of responsibility that includes a similar condition, see
FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 32 passim.
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But even if the addict, or the sex offender, is not willing to risk certain
punishment, the real question ought to be how much of a risk the
compulsion leads to.'01
What should we say about the person whose compulsion leads him
to extremely risky behavior? I think that even those who, like Morse,
would prefer to think of this as a question about rationality will
sometimes concede that responsibility is not present. But they then
characterize the behavior as irrational, involving a cognitive defect, and
not as involving a volitional or control defect. This is not merely a
matter of labeling. The problem is that when we go looking for the
cognitive defect we find none, and end up with Morse classifying most
of these offenders as responsible for their behavior.10 2 These are not
cases of defective rationality, not if we make the least effort to say what
exactly defective rationality is. When we attempt to do that, we see that
compulsive behavior does not require misapprehension or misinference.
The compulsive sex offender might know quite well what the chances
are of his being caught, and the chances might be quite high, though
somewhat short of certainty.
V.

CONCLUSION: TYING THE ENDS TOGETHER

Much more is involved here than just trading one label for another.
For if in fact we can make sense of volitional difficulties, and if beyond
that, we have evidence (as in many cases we appear to) that some people
suffer from these volitional difficulties, we are back at our original
problem: If there are people who understand the consequences of their
actions but lack sufficient control to conform their behavior to the law,
what are we to say about a law that subjects them to both punishment
and preventive detention?
This is not the place to draw out a complete theory of punishment,
and I would not attempt it in any case. But there are some plausible
conclusions we may draw about punishment, conclusions that dictate a
particular outcome for the sex predator laws. The reasoning goes
something like this: To the extent that punishment can be justified at all,
it cannot be justified either as retribution or as example-making.
Punishment is retribution, as a matter of definition; and it may serve to
deter others, as a matter of fact. But justification requires something
101.

For a similar qualification of the Fischer-Ravizza criterion, see Michael Smith, Rational

Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion, in WEAKNESS OF

WILL AND PRACTICAL IRRATIONALITY 17 passim (Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet eds., 2003).
102. See supranotes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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more. It is true that the threat of punishment can be justified by its
generally deterrent effect: the state fulfills its obligation to protect us
from each other largely by defining crimes and attaching the threat of
punishment to each of them. But the threat is not enough in some cases;
the threat has to be realized. Some will not be deterred unless they
experience punishment. But punishment itself cannot be justified in
terms of general deterrence without the undesirable consequence of
justifying the punishment of innocent people. The only justification left
for punishment must be its effect on the person being punished: it is a
last resort to be used against the person who cannot be deterred by the
mere threat of punishment, to impress upon him the seriousness of his
act. Unlike general deterrence-example-making-this justification does
not see the criminal as a tool to be used to affect the behavior of others,
though of course that may be a consequence of punishing him; nor does
it depend upon the retributive idea that the world is a better place for his
punishment, regardless of the consequences of that punishment.
Once we have taken both retribution and example-making out of
the picture, it becomes pointless to punish those who do not understand
what they are doing, for their view of the world cannot benefit by being
punished. And it would be equally pointless to punish those who suffer
from extreme difficulty in controlling their behavior. It may seem
awkward to call such people insane, and it is unfortunate that the only
responsibility defense we have is the insanity defense. But we have in
the past made room in the defense for those who could not control their
behavior, and if we have legislatively recognized, in the sex-predator
and other laws, the possibility that such people exist, it may be time to
pull the older more comprehensive defense out of the storage room and
re-examine it.

But what, finally, about offenders who fall into that category
Slobogin brought to our attention, of those who can control their
behavior, who can respond to the threat of punishment, but will not: the
terrorist; the hardened criminal; the civilly disobedient? Are they beyond
punishment? Should they immediately be shipped over for indefinite
detention? I think the answer to that must be no, but I think it is not an
easy question in any case.' 0 3 The important point about detention in the

103. Certainly there are other more or less enlightened legal systems in which detention is an
alternative to punishment available for the persistent offender. It is not considered shocking in
Germany, for example, or in many other Western countries, to learn that some offender, typically a
repeat offender, has been committed to detention rather than punishment. See Demleitner, supra
note 6 at 1642 passim. But indefinite detention of competent actors is outside the Anglo-American
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case of those who are cognitively and volitionally sound is that we
cannot be sure that punishment itself will not work on them. In the past
we have trusted that it would, and have often been disappointed. But
unless the offender suffers from a condition which makes it impossible
for him to respond to punishment, we cannot know that he will not
respond. And therefore, in those cases, detention should not be
considered until punishment has been tried. The person who murders or
rapes the second time may be a candidate for detention. I am not saying
that he is, but certainly no one who is sane and who has not been
subjected to punishment should be a candidate for indefinite detention.

tradition, and you cannot normally change one aspect of a legal system-adopting a feature that
works well abroad-without risking a more significant change in the system as a result.
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